Article 1307. Innominate contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the provisions of Titles I and II of this Book, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the place.
Artikulo 1307. Ang hindi tiyak ang taguri na kontrata ay babatasan ayon sa kanilang napagusapan, sa mga probisyon ng titilo uno at titulo ikalawa ng aklat na ito, ng patakaran sang-ayon sa halos katulad ng kontrata na may taguri at ng nakaugalian na sa kanilang lugar.
CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS
They are:
(1) Nominate contract or that which has a specific name or designation in law (e.g., commodatum, lease, agency, sale, etc.); and
(2) Innominate contract or that which has no specific name or designation in law.
SPECIFIC RULES THAT MAY GOVERN INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
- Agreement of the parties;
- Titles I and II of Book IV — Obligations and Contracts;
- Rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts;
- Custom of the place.
REASONS FOR INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
The impossibility of anticipating all forms of agreement on one hand, and the progress of man’s sociological and economic relationships on the other, justify this provision. A contract will not, therefore, be considered invalid for failure to conform strictly to the standard contracts outlined in the Civil Code provided it has all the elements of a valid contract.
Innominate contracts are based on the well-known principle that “no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.”
4 KINDS OF INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
(a) do ut des (I give that you may give) is an agreement in which A will give one thing to B, so that B will give another thing to A.
(b) do ut facias (I give that you may do) is a contract under which A will give something to B, in order that B may do something for A.
(c) facio ut des (I do that you may give) is an agreement in which A binds himself to do something for B, so that B will give something to A.
(d) facio ut facias (I do that you may do) is a convention whereby A is to do something for B, so that B will render some other service to A.
CASE
VICENTE PEREZ vs. EUGENIO POMAR
G.R. No. L-1299. November 16, 1903.
TORRES, J.
FACTS:
Vicente Filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna a complaint against the defendant herein to determine the amount due to the plaintiff, at the customary rate of compensation for interpreting in these island, for rendering services in the Tabacalera company.
In the complaint it was alleged that the defendant rendered the services of the plaintiff to act as interpreter between former and the military authorities; not just for the latter but also between the defendant and the colonel commanding the local garrison and with various officer residing in the area, to the end that such services might be punctually rendered, the agent, Pomar, assured him that the Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services rendered it, and that he therefore did not trouble himself about his inability to devote the necessary amount of time to his business, the defendant going so far as to make him flattering promises of employment with the company, which he did not accept; that these statements were made in the absence of witnesses and that therefore his only proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar’s word as a gentleman;
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on September 25, 1902 asking for the dismissal of the complaint with the cost to the plaintiff, the defendant denied the allegation and stated that it is wholly untrue, the defendant also stated that the plaintiff acted as interpreter of his own free will, without being requested to do so by the defendant and without any offer of payment or compensation; that therefore there existed no legal relation whatever between the company and the plaintiff, and the defendant.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner.
HELD
Yes. The Court decision is that the judgement should be rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos. The Court ruled out that if there is a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services, the defendant is still obliged to pay such compensation to the petitioner even if there is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of quasi-contract. When one party knowingly receives something for nothing, the courts may impose a quasi contract. Under a quasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an agreement. Instead, an arrangement is imposed by a judge to rectify an occurrence of unjust enrichment. On the services rendered by the petitioner in the province of Laguna, it follows that there was a bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner expected him to pay his rendition of service. Provided in Article 22 of the Civil Code, Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The fact that the defendant consented to accept an interpreter’s services on various occasions, rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is just that he should pay the reasonable payment because it is well-known principle of law that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
JOSE P. DIZON vs. ALFREDO G. GABORRO
G.R. No. L-36821. June 22, 1978.
GUERRERO, J.
FACTS
Petitioner, Jose P. Dizon, was the owner of the three parcels of land, situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He constituted a first mortgage to DBP to secure a loan of P38,000.00 and a second mortgage to PNB amounting P93,831.91.
Petitioner defaulted in the payment of his debt, therefore, the Development Bank of the Philippines foreclosed the mortgage extra-judicially. Gaborro became interested in the lands of Dizon. But since the property was already foreclosed by the DPB. They then entered into a contract captioned as “Deed of sale with assumption of mortgage” and the second contract executed the same day, is called “Option to Purchase Real Estate” After the execution of said contracts, Alfredo G. Gaborro took possession of the three parcels of land.
After the execution of the contract and its conditions to him, Gaborro made several payments to the DBP and PNB. He improved, cultivated the kinds raised sugarcane and other crops produce.
Jose P. Dizon through his lawyer, wrote a letter to Gaborro informing him that he is formally offering reimburse Gaborro of what he paid to the banks. Gaborro did not agreed to the demands of the petitioner, hence, Jose P. Dizon instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, alleging that the documents Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage and the Option to Purchase Real Estate did not express the true intention and agreement between the parties. Petitioner, contended that the two deeds constitute in fact a single transaction that their real agreement was not an absolute sale of the land but merely an equitable mortgage or conveyance by way of security for the reimbursement or refund by Dizon to Gaborro of any and all sums which the latter may have paid on account of the mortgage debts in favor of the DBP and the PNB.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contract showed the true agreement between the parties.
RULING
No. The court held that the true agreement between the plaintiff and defendant is that the defendant would assume and pay the indebtedness of the plaintiff to DBP and PNB, and in consideration therefore, the defendant was given the possession and enjoyment of the properties in question until the plaintiff shall have reimbursed to defendant fully the amount of P131,831.91 plus 8% interest per annum from October 6, 1959 until full payment, said right to be exercised within one year from the date the judgment becomes final, if he fails to do so within the said period, then he is deemed to have lost his right over the lands forever.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 