Article 1193. Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed, shall be demandable only when that day comes.
Obligations with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the day certain.
A day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when.
If the uncertainty consists in whether the day will come or not, the obligation is conditional and it shall be regulated by the rules of the preceding Section.
Artikulo 1193. Ang mga obligasyon na kung saan ang katuparan ay naitakda na sa tiyak na araw ay mahihingi lamang sa pagdating ng araw na naitakda.
Ang mga obligasyon na may resolutory period ay magkakabisa agad, ngunit ito ay matatapos sa pagdating ng tiyak na araw.
Ang tiyak na araw ay malinaw na kailangang dumating, bagaman maaaring hindi alam kung kailan.
Kung may pag-aalinlangan sa pagdating ng araw na ito o hindi, ang obligasyon ay kondisyonal, at ito ay pinapatakbo ng patakaran ng nakalipas na seksyon.
Period and term have the same meaning and are used interchangeably. It consists in a space or length of time upon the arrival of which, the demandability or extinguishment of an obligation is determined.
A period is a certain length of time which determines the effectivity or the extinguishment of obligations.
A day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when.
“On or about” may be two or three days before or after the date mentioned but not so remote thereafter.
PERIOD DISTINGUISHED FROM A CONDITION
(a) In their fulfillment — A condition is an uncertain event; but a period is an event which must happen sooner or later, at a date known beforehand, or a time which cannot be determined.
(b) With reference to time — A period always refers to the future, a condition may under the law refer even to the past.
(c) As to influence on the obligation — A condition causes an obligation to arise or to cease, but a period merely fixes the time or the efficaciousness of an obligation. It is true that a period may have a suspensive or resolutory effect, but in the former, it cannot prevent the birth of the obligation in due time, and in the latter, it does not militate against its existence.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID PERIOD OR TERM
(a) It must refer to the future.
(b) It must be certain (sure to come) but can be extended. (If eliminated subsequently by mutual agreement, the obligation becomes pure and immediately demandable).
(c) It must be physical and legally possible, otherwise the obligation is void. (Example: “I’ll give you my house one year after your death.” The obligation here is void.)
KINDS OF TERMS
1. Ex Die – a term or period with a suspensive effect, which means the obligation becomes effective only from the arrival of a certain day.
Illustration: Joey promises to support Rachel from the death of Rachel’s father, which means the obligation only begins from the death of Rachel’s father.
2. In Diem – a term or period with a resolutory effect, which means the obligation will subsist up to a certain day and it terminates upon the arrival of that day.
Illustration: Joey promises to support Rachel until Rachel reaches her majority age, which means the obligation is already effective but will terminate once Rachel turns 18.
EFFECT OF PERIOD
Obligations with a term are demandable only when the day fixed for their performance arrives. Thus, in actions for the recovery of debts payable in installments, those not yet due and payable cannot be demanded in the complaint.
Case No. 1:
LIRAG TEXTILE MILLS, INC. vs COURT OF APPEALS & CRISTAN ALCANTARA
G.R. No. L-30736 April 14, 1975
ESGUERRA, J.
Facts:
On May 11, 1960, Felix Lirag was a member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Chamber of Industries. Then, for about two months, prior to May 11, 1960, Alcantara worked in a temporary capacity with defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. During this same period of time, defendant Felix Lirag was a director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. On May 9, 1960, defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. wrote a letter to Alcantara advising him that, effective May 11, 1960, his temporary designation as Technical Assistant to the Administrative Officer was made permanent. As Assistant to the Administrative Officer of the Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. as of May 11, 1960 plaintiff received a salary of P400.00 and allowance of P100.00 per month. Plaintiff’s tenure of employment, per defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.’s above letter of May 9, 1960 was to be ‘for an indefinite period, unless sooner terminated by reason of voluntary resignation or by virtue of a valid cause or causes”
On July 22, 1961, defendant Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. wrote plaintiff (Alcantara) a letter advising him that because the company has suffered some serious reverses, both in terms of pecuniary loss and in market opportunities, the company was terminating his services and effecting his separation from defendant corporation (a ground which proved, however, to be false because Lirag Textile Mills Inc.’s original capital of P5,000,000.00 was, on May 2, 1961, increased to P15,000,000.00 per certification issued by the Security and Exchange Commission)
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the written contract of employment executed by the parties.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner contends that it committed no violation on the basis of RA 1787, which provides:
Sec. 1. In case of employment without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer may terminate at any time the employment with just cause, or without just cause or in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at least one month in advance or one half month for every year of service of the employee, whichever is longer.
However, this provision cannot apply in the case at bar. The contract of employment was for an INDEFINITE period as it shall continue without ending, subject to a resolutory period – namely – voluntary resignation on the part of private respondent Alcantara or termination of employment at the option of petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, but for a “valid cause or causes”. A “period” has been defined “as a space of time which has an influence on obligation as a result of a juridical act, and either suspends their demandableness or produces their extinguishment.” Obligations with a period are those whose consequences are subjected in one way or another to the expiration of said period or term. . A day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when”.
Given that Alcantara did not resign, it is imperative to determing whether there was a valid cause to terminate his employment. Evaluating the evidence presented, the Court found no truth nor basis for petitioner Lirag Textile Mills’ contention that the valid cause for terminating private respondent Alcantara’s employment was that the former “has suffered serious reverses, both in terms of pecuniary loss and in market opportunities.
Case No. 2
SMITH, BELL & CO. V. SOTELO MATTI
G.R. No. L-16570. March 9, 1922.
ROMUALDEZ, J.
Facts:
Plaintiff Smith, Bell & Co and the defendant Mr. Vicente Sotel entered into a contract. Plaintiff has to deliver (1) two steel tanks shipped from New York to Manila within three or four months, (2) two expellers shipped from San Francisco in the month of September 1918 or as soon as possible, and (3) two electric motors with “approximate delivery within ninety days. – This is not guaranteed.”
The tanks arrived at Manila on 27 April 1919; the expellers on 26 October 1918; and the motors on 27 February 1919. Upon notification from plaintiff, defendant refused to receive any of the goods or to pay for their price. Plaintiff alleged that the expellers and motors were in good condition.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant. The defendant, Mr Sotelo and intervenor, Manila Oil Refining and By-Products Co., Inc., denied the plaintiff’s allegations. They allege that due to plaintiff’s delay in the delivery of goods, the intervenor suffered damages.
The lower court absolved the defendants from the complaint insofar as the tanks and the electric motors were concerned, but rendered judgment against them ordering them to receive expellers and pay the sum of P50,000, with legal interest and cost.
Both parties appealed to the Court.
Issue:
What period was fixed for the delivery of the goods? Did the plaintiff incur delay in the delivery of goods?
Ruling:
The term which parties attempted to fix is so uncertain that once cannot tell just whether, as a matter of fact, those articles could be brought to Manila or not. The obligation must be regarded as conditional. The delivery was subject to a condition the fulfillment of which depended not only upon the effort of the plaintiff, but upon the will of third persons who could in no way be compelled to fulfill the condition.
It is sufficiently proven in the record that the plaintiff has made all the efforts it could possibly be expected to make under the circumstances, to bring the goods in question to Manila, as soon as possible it is obvious that the plaintiff has complied with its obligation.
When the time of delivery is not fixed in the contract, time is regarded unessential. In such cases, the delivery must be made within a reasonable time. Reasonable time for the delivery of the goods by the seller is to be determined by circumstances attending the particular transactions. Whether of not the delivery of the machinery in litigation was offered to the defendant within a reasonable time, is a question to be determined by the court. The plaintiff has not been guilty of any delay in the fulfillment of its obligation.
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS 